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Abstract 
Purpose – Alternative corporate governance systems (CGSs) have attracted a significant bulk of  
research recently. While the connection between the adoption of an alternative system (one tier board 
or two tier board system) and firms’ performances has not been fully analysed yet, the purpose of this 
paper is to analyse whether companies which have turned into an alternative board system have  
eventually improved their performance over time. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of more than 15,000 Italian unlisted joint 
stock companies, the authors compare performance outcomes in 2009 of firms adopting alternative  
systems with performances of firms that maintained the system in force before the 2003 Corporate Law  
Reform (defined as “traditional”). Because of the choice of an alternative system (one tier or two tier  
board) instead of a traditional one is not random, the authors reduce selection bias implementing  
matching methods and comparing firms that are close in terms of propensity score measured in 2003 
(the year before the new CGSs have been introduced by a corporate law reform). 
Findings – The authors do not find evidence of a significant improvement of performances in 
2009 concerning those firms that have adopted a one tier or two tier board systems with respect to  
those which maintained a traditional one. 
Originality/value – The novelty of the study concerns the application of propensity score matching 
for the evaluation of the impact of the change of the CGS that is possible in presence of two conditions 
that are all verified in our setting: first, to have a country where corporate law allows for choosing  
among different systems; in this case Italy is a good laboratory, because it allows for the choice among 
three different systems; and second, to have the opportunity to evaluate the effect of the change in  
light of a relatively recent “pre-treatment” condition; this is made possible by the fact that before the 
2003 Reform of corporate law all the companies had a traditional system. 
Keywords Corporate governance, Firm performance, One-tier board, Propensity score, Two-tier board 































1. Introduction and literature review 
This paper provides an innovative point of view in the corporate governance debate, 
enquiring whether the adoption of alternative governance systems is likely to improve 
firms’ performances. Financial literature has mainly devoted its attention to the impact 
of a properly designed board composition on firms’ performance for listed corporations, 
documenting the idea that an appropriate board structure is relevant for good 
corporate governance (Dahya et al., 2002; Hossain et al., 2001; Carline et al., 2002) and 
that investors are likely to pay for it. The same happens for small and medium 
privately held enterprises (Uhlaner et al., 2007) or eventually with more widespread 
ownership structure (Brunninge et al., 2007). 
In relation to the US market, Gompers et al. (2003) analyse the relationship between 
corporate governance and long-term equity returns, giving evidence that well-governed 
companies trigger 8.5 per cent yearly abnormal returns in comparison with poorly 
governed firms. Larcker et al. (2003) develop extensive innovative measures for 
corporate governance, showing that these factors are related to future operating 
performance, Tobin’s Q, and future excess stock returns. Moreover, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) outline that better corporate governance, stock ownership of board members, 
and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better 
contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance. In relation to small and 
medium enterprises, Shaker et al. (2007) find that governance systems, and more 
specifically the presence of independent outside directors in the board, influence 
knowledge based resources necessary for the development of internationalization. 
With specific attention to alternative corporate governance systems (CGSs), 
financial literature has mainly devoted its efforts in analysing the corporate 
determinants of the choice among different CGSs for listed companies in terms of 
efficiency and agency costs with relation to Germany and UK ( Jungmann, 2006) and to 
France (Millet-Reyes and Zhao, 2010). 
The case of Italy, addressed in literature by Bellavite Pellegrini et al. (2010), is 
particularly interesting, because of the recent corporate law reform, approved in 2003 
and implemented since the 1st January 2004, which allowed Italian companies to  
eventually adopt two new CGSs as alternatives to the traditional one composed by a  
Board of Directors and a Board of Auditors. The possibility to choose among three 
different CGSs and the relatively recent availability of pre-choice data allows us for an 
original longitudinal study, devotes to understand whether the adoption of an 
alternative system between 2003 and 2009 induced improvements in performance 
changes with respect to the firms that maintained a traditional system. 
Past studies focused on the effect of the reform on the costs and to the expenses of 
board members (Bellavite Pellegrini et al., 2013) comparing companies opting for 
alternative one with unlisted joint stock firms which, conversely, maintained a traditional  
one. The outcomes highlight that one-tier model, which is more likely to be adopted 
by small firms, with more fragmented ownership structure and under control and 
coordination, is less expensive in “pro capite” remuneration of board members than the 
traditional and the two tier model. However, not any other previous studies generalized 
the analysis to overall firm’s performance after the adoption of one among the two 
alternative systems introduced by the Reform. Indeed Bellavite Pellegrini et al. (2013) is 
limited only to the remuneration of the board members and leaves out overall firm 
performances, while the issue of how governance mechanisms affect the firm strategy 
covers also other broader aspects of business management (Giovannini, 2009), especially 
with respect to unlisted enterprises (Brunninge et al., 2007; Al-Najjar, 2015). 
 
 
In light of the existing literature, differently from Bellavite Pellegrini and Sironi  
(2015) which focuses its attention exclusively on one tier model, this paper aims at  
expanding the debate around the effect of the adoption of an alternative system 
(one tier or two tier) instead of a traditional one, focusing on the overall change in firm 
performances after that choice. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some technical details while  
Section 3 displays descriptive statistics of the data. Section 4 presents the statistical  
methodology and Section 5 presents the empirical results, meanwhile the last section 
discusses and concludes. 
2. The corporate governance reform in Italy 
In the Italian business system, which is characterized by a continuing predominance of 
small and medium-sized enterprises closely controlled by families, corporate governance is 
a debated issue: the possibility of choosing between two new alternative CGSs (i.e. one-tier 
and two-tier boards) instead of the traditional one was introduced in Italy by the corporate 
law reform implemented at the beginning of 2004. The normative background of the 
reform, which dates back to Title III of the Regulation 2157/2001 (October 2001), dictated 
the rules concerning the governance structure of the “European Society”, identifying two 
alternative models of management and control and leaving the choice to statutory 
autonomy (Art. 38). The choice between these two models of corporate governance (one-tier 
and two-tier), thanks to their diffusion within the European Union, has even been shared 
by the Italian legislator, which introduced new opportunities for Italian firms to adopt these 
alternative CGSs (Art. 2409-octies and ss. and 2409-sexiesdecies and ss. of the Civil Code). 
This choice was not feasible before 2004, and thus represents an innovative approach to 
corporate governance within the Italian framework (Ghezzi and Malberti, 2008). 
The one-tier model, which derives from the Anglo-Saxon tradition with some 
peculiarities due to the different framework, looks like to be simpler and more flexible 
than the others. This model is interesting for at least two reasons. The first is that it  
saves time and money compared to the other two models: the Board of Directors 
(traditional model) and the Supervisory board often use up time and costs that are not 
always justified and that could be reduced. The second reason is the improved 
information transparency between the Board of Directors and the controlling body 
(composed of directors who are part of the board), which allows a larger amount of 
information to reach this controlling body that should perform better in its supervisory 
function than the traditional Board of Auditors. On the other hand, the identifying 
feature of this model seems to be that of the “closeness” between the controller and the 
controlled, which undermines the “independence” of the body. 
In contrast, the two-tier model could be defined as the most composite one. It should 
be clarified that in Italy the two-tier model has not perfectly replicated the German 
discipline, but has incorporated some changes in order to make it suitable for the Italian  
legislative framework. One important difference is related to the composition of the 
Supervisory Board. Compared to the provisions of the German two tier system, 
Italian legislative framework does not allow any representatives of stakeholders to be 
appointed as members of this body due to the different nature of their relationship with 
the corporation. Moreover, the function of consultations with social partners is not 
expected to be one of the duties of supervisory boards in Italy. 
Many of the opportunities related to the adoption of the two-tier model are gathered 
in comparison with the discipline of the traditional model. In particular, with regard to 






degree of flexibility in the former’s power to appoint and dismiss members, together with 
less stringent conditions of independence, impartiality and professional requirements, 
could affect efficiency in different ways. Furthermore, the closeness between the two 
bodies should allow management to be monitored more closely, with a positive effect on 
conflicts of interest. Some researchers, however, have also highlighted the critical issues 
and risks relating to the adoption of this model (Abbadessa, 2009). On the other hand, 
similarly to both the traditional and the two-tier models, we can observe the presence of 
an external auditor who checks the firm’s compliance with accounting procedures. 
Over the years, some evidence has shown that the one-tier system is probably more 
efficient in cases where the company has a majority or prevailing shareholder. The joining 
together of the managerial and supervisory bodies may be beneficial, because it makes the 
adoption of important decisions faster and more efficient. A different situation occurs in 
the presence of a dispersed ownership structure. In these companies, the shareholders are 
unable to articulate the goals of the company as their interests differ. In such cases, an 
important role may be played by the supervisory board, which is separate from the 
management board – as highlighted in the two-tier model. The separation between these 
two bodies leads to positive effects in terms of better-quality supervision and more 
transparent decisions, made in the key interests of the shareholders. 
In spite of this evidence, some questions relating to body composition, overlapping 
tasks and coordination remain unanswered, thus identifying the lack of a universal  
answer to the question of which corporate governance model should be adopted in 
different situations, particularly with regard to the actual power of the two-tier model to 
meet the interests of the company and its shareholders (Enriques and Volpin, 2007). 
Hence, in this paper we explore the relationships between the change of CGS and firm 
performance, testing the theoretical framework explored in the literature and 
implementing an accurate analysis on a large sample of more than 15,000 firms. 
 
3. Data and description 
We take into analysis a wide sample of the Italian unlisted joint stock companies  
enroled in “Register of Companies” for the years 2003 and 2009. All accounting data 
have been obtained from Aida BvD, while the list of the companies featured by one 
tier and two tier boards belonging to our sample in 2009 have been obtained by  
Infocamere Archive, a database implemented by the Chamber of Commerce. We rely  
on two different databases, because Infocamere Archive provides us complete 
evidence about the universe of all the joint stock companies existing in Italy and of  
those which eventually implemented one tier or two tier board, but does not provide 
full evidence about corporate and accounting data in 2003 and 2009. For this reason 
we have to rely on the above mentioned Aida BvD, which however does not cover the 
whole universe. Since our attention is concentrated on firm performances with the 
aim to verify whether the adoption of one or two tier board did eventually affect their 
performance, we have to compare results obtained by these firms prior and after the 
2003 Italian reform. 
Table I compares the whole universe of joint stock companies[1] with the ones 
belonging in our sample and the same for joint stock companies adopting alternative 
systems in 2009. 
Table I shows that joint stock companies which adopted an alternative CGSs 
represents 0.55 per cent[2] of the population and the ratio between one tier and two tier  
companies in our sample and the total of joint stock companies belonging to our sample 
is 1.27 per cent. Almost six years after its first introduction, one tier board was still 
 
 
quite uncommon among Italian joint stock companies. Table II provides some evidence 
about the geographical distribution of Italian unlisted joint stock companies belonging 
to the sample in 2009. 
Table II gives evidence that the majority of Italian joint stock companies is located in  
North of Italy and more specifically in North-West and the same occurs for companies 
adopting alternative CGSs. About 16 per cent of the sample is located in the central  
regions of Italy, meanwhile the southern Italian regions and the islands account for 
about 6 per cent. Focusing our attention to the activities of Italian joint stock companies 
we find the evidences highlighted in Table III. 
Previous tables show an identikit of firms adopting traditional and alternative 
corporate providing details on the sector and on geographical localization. These sorts 
of variables are time invariant and are the same between 2003 and 2009. 
Conversely, balance sheet items are time dependent and vary across years. 
In addition, the adoption of an alternative CGSs may affect the firm strategy and 
consequently their performance in the medium run. Nevertheless, the choice of 
changing CGS may also be affected by different performance indicators, such as by  
modifications in the ownership structure. Hence, it is interesting to offer an overview of 
balance sheet items in 2003, i.e. before the reform that allows for adopting alternative 
systems, by CGS in 2009, in order to understand whether selectivity characterized firms 
that chose to change their CGS later. 
Results in Table IV confirm our previous assumption: several indicators are 
different for firms belonging to traditional and alternative CGSs. In particular, one tier 
model displays best performances in terms of ROE and ROA before the implementation 
of the Reform, suggesting that more efficient firms were most likely to choose a simpler 
system. Conversely, one tier board companies display the lowest level of revenues from 





Corporate governance system at 31 December 2009 Sample Population % (Sample/population) 
 
Traditional companies 14,862 57,107 25.71 Table I. 
One tier board companies 134 180 74.44 Universe of joint 
Two tier board companies 58 138 42.03 stock companies and 
Total 15,054 57,425  composition of the 





system at 31 













unlisted Italian joint 
stock companies 
with traditional and 
alternative corporate 
governance systems 
belonging to the 
sample in 2009 
 
 
Traditional companies 6,829 (45.95%) 4,251 (28.6%) 2,422 (16.3%) 902 (6.07%) 458 (3.08%) 14,862 (100%) 
One tier board       
companies 71 (52.99%) 25 (18.66%) 22 (16.42%) 10 (7.46%) 6 (4.48%) 134 (100%) 
Two tier board       
companies 24 (41.38%) 24 (41.38%) 4 (6.90%) 5 (8.62%) 1 (1.72%) 58 (100%) 
































Total 14,862 100 134 100 58 100  15,054 100 







Means of balance 
Income balance 
sheet items 2003 
Traditional 
companies 
One tier board 
companies 
Two tier board 
companies 
sheet items of 






for the year 2003 
ROE 3.754 8.865 −3.085 
ROA 3.749 4.521 1.180 
Leverage 5.954 5.264 4.726 
Net worth 1.71 × 107 0.70 × 107 0.93 × 107 
Revenues from sales 3.98 × 107 2.10 × 107 2.17 × 107 
Net income 717,184.8 493,775.5 370,184 
Total assets 5.33 × 107 2.19 × 107 2.47 × 107 




small-medium enterprises. Two tier board companies, which are the smallest number of 
all, present very peculiar features: they are characterized by the lowest levels in some 
performance indicators (ROE and ROA), while traditional firms show the highest levels 
of total assets, revenues from sales and total assets. This last observation presents the 
traditional one as the system preferred by medium-large enterprises. 
Hence, these aspects demonstrate that a process of auto-selection probably involved 
the choice of changing a CGS. The systematic difference in balance sheet indicators  
does not allows for estimating the effect of the adoption of an alternative corporate 
governance on comparing the simple difference in means of the outcomes in 2009. 
Therefore, we need a more reliable estimation strategy in order to reduce the bias  
deriving from selectivity. 
Accomodation and food 
 
service activity 248 1.67 0 0.00 2 3.45 250 1.66 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 90 0.61 1 0.75 0 0.00 91 0.60 
Arts, entertainment         
and recreation 97 0.65 4 2.99 1 1.72 102 0.68 
Construction 956 6.43 5 3.73 6 10.34 967 6.42 
Electricity, gas and stream 378 2.54 3 2.24 2 3.45 383 2.54 
Financial and insurance activities 127 0.85 4 2.99 5 8.62 136 0.90 
Human health, social work         
activities and education 204 1.37 1 0.75 0 0.00 205 1.36 
Information and communication 452 3.04 7 5.22 0 0.00 459 3.05 
Manufacturing 7,302 49.13 54 40.30 22 37.93 7,378 49.01 
Professional, scientific and         
 Table III. technical activities 583 3.92 18 13.43 5 8.62 606 4.03 
Economic activity Real estate activities 444 2.99 5 3.73 5 8.62 454 3.02 
classification of Transportation and storage 652 4.39 4 2.99 0 0.00 656 4.36 
unlisted Italian joint Wholesale and retail trade 2,846 19.15 24 17.91 10 17.24 2,880 19.13 
stock companies Not available 20 0.13 3 2.24 0 0.00 23 0.15 
with traditional and Other 463 3.12 1 0.75 0 0.00 464 3.08 
 
0i 





1 0 1 0 




4. Research questions and methodology 
As above mentioned, our analysis is focused in enquiring whether there exists an effect  
deriving from the choice of a specific CGS on firm economic performances . For this 
reason we implement a statistical analysis with the aim to discover whether the 
adoption of one tier (two tier) board did affect companies’ economic outcomes with 
respect to the performances of firms that decided to maintain a traditional system 
between 2003 and 2009[3]. 
More in detail, we aim at answering to the following test of hypotheses: 
H0. Firms that adopted an alternative system have not improved their performance. 
H1. Firms that adopted an alternative system have improved their performance. 
The H0 suggests that there is no evidence of an improvement of firm performance,  
meaning that CGSs did not contribute to achieve better economic results, which might be  
unchanged or even worsen. Conversely, the alternative H1 allows for a sort of positive 
relationship between a one tier or two tier board system of corporate governance and 
firm performances, implying that the former have had a positive impact on the latter.  
Performance indices considered as outcome variables for testing the improvement in 
performances of corporation that turned into one tier or two tier board systems are those  
that are ROE, ROA, the leverage ratio and the sales to assets ratio. 
To measure the effect of the adoption of a one tier (or two tier) board system, we 
assume a potential outcome approach; each firm is supposed to have two potential  




and Y 2009:Y 2009 
0i 1i in the case the firm have adopted a one tier (two tier) board between 
2003 and 2009 and Y 2009 if it has maintained a traditional CGS in the time considered. 
The causal impact of the adoption of one specific alternative system for a firm included 
in the analysis is Y 2009  Y 2009. Since this is a firm specific variable, Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggested focusing on the quantity E Y 1i Y 0i that in econometric 
literature is defined as the average treatment effect; i.e. in our case the average effect of  
the adoption of the alternative system on the outcome of interest. Let Ti be a 
dichotomous variable, denoted in potential outcome literature as treatment, which 
takes value 1 if a firm adopted a one-tier (or two tier in a separate alternative analysis) 
board system between 2003 and 2009 and 0 otherwise, Heckman (1997) proposed to  
restrict the analysis only to those firms that are actually eligible for the treatment (in  
our case the choice of an alternative system). Hence, leaving out the subscript i the main 
quantity of interest is: 
ATT ¼ E
h








Y 20099T  ¼ 1
i 
(1) 
That is defined average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), where E Y 20099T ¼ 1 
is unobservable, because only one among the potential outcomes can be observed for 
each enterprise. A possible solution to overcome this problem is to consider the 
difference between treated and untreated groups: 
ATT ¼ E
h












This assumes that there is no selection bias, which means that the firms that adopted a 
one tier (two tier) board system is randomly selected from the population so that the 
two groups may be considered as comparable in all other relevant characteristics. 
¼ 1i 0i 
0 0i 
pðX Þ 1 0 
 
 However, this assumption is not realistic because the two groups may be different in  terms of both observable and unobservable characteristics. Hence, identification of the ATT in (3) is 
feasible if we condition the expected values on a vector of covariates that summarizes all 
differences between the treated and control groups; this requires imposition of mean 
independence (Smith and Todd, 2005), i.e.: 
E
h








A second problem dealing with ATT estimates concerns the difficulty in finding 
entities with identical values of vector X2003 when the covariates are many or include 
continuous indices, as in the case of balance sheet. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
proposed matching based on univariate quantity called a propensity score, which is  







T  ¼ 19X2003
i 
(4) 
Matching units with the same propensity score is equivalent to comparing them on the 
components[4] of X2003, together with the advantage that an estimate of the propensity 
score is easily obtained through a simple logistic regression. Therefore, the ATT with  
the propensity score approach (ATTPSM) can be formalised as: 
















; T  ¼ 0
io    
(5) 
 
Another problematic aspect in determining the ATTPSM consists in the reliability of 
estimates only in presence of selection bias from observable characteristics. 
The method illustrated above is developed for all the companies. As we have to 
obtain sample estimates of ATT, we cannot find firms with exactly equal values of 
propensity score. Indeed in presence of a continuous it is unlikely in presence of finite 
samples to find one treated and one control with the exact value of propensity score. 
A comparison, in practise, is feasible only if we match similar units drawn from treated 
and controls. The more similar the estimates propensity score of treated units with the 
selected controls, the higher the reduction of selection bias will be. Therefore, we have 
to implement matching algorithms (Sianesi and Leuven, 2003) in order to overcome the  
problem and to find a procedure for selection and then comparing firms that are as  
close as possible in terms of estimated propensity score. In this framework, we 
implement nearest neighbour matching without replacement that is suggested in 
presence of few treated units vs a large sample of control units (Caliendo and Kopeinig,  
2008)[5]. Nearest neighbour matching which consists of comparing each treated unit i 
with the closest control unit in terms of propensity score. In this case, we will have 
the following: 
AT^ T 










i A fTi¼1g j A fTi¼0g 
where N1 indicates the number of units that experienced a change into a one tier 
(two tier) board system, and wij represents a sample weight for control units used in the 
matching procedure and is usually equal to one. 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
Table V displays the results of estimated ATT after having run propensity score. 
The vector X2003 used in order to reduce the bias of estimates includes all qualitative 
and quantitative variables that significantly affect the probability of abandoning a 
traditional system in favour of a one tier (two tier) one documented by the existing 
literature (see Bellavite Pellegrini et al., 2010). The set of qualitative variables includes: 
the legal form[6], the economic activity[7] (excluded in the last stage of the analysis  
because not significant) and the geographical location[8]. Vector X2003 includes also 
quantitative variables that are all measured in 2003: total assets, net worth, net assets 
and the starting level of the outcome variables before the change of the CGSs, i.e. ROE,  
ROA, leverage and the sales to assets ratio (presented in Table IV). 
The first column of Table V lists the outcome of interests, splitting the analysis in 
two parts. The first one presents a comparison between the performances of one tier  
model CGSs vs traditional companies (after the provisional exclusion of two tier board 
system corporations). The second part of the analysis compares the performances of  
firms adopting a two tier board system against a traditional one. For each of the two 
models taken into account we consider unmatched and matched estimations. 
Unmatched estimations of ATT are obtained without propensity score; matched 
estimates of ATT are obtained with propensity score matching. 
As we can see from the Table V, estimates of ATT relevantly vary after running 
propensity score. While unmatched estimates takes into consideration equally 
firms drawn from the treated and the control groups, estimated ATT computes the 
differences only between treated and the subsample of controls that are closest in  
terms of propensity score. More in details, it matches each firm adopting a one tier 
board or two tier board system with the traditional company that is closest in 
terms of propensity score. This procedure allows us for comparing only similar 
companies, estimating the net effect of the adoption of an alternative system 
and reducing the bias in estimates that derives from considering companies that are 
too different, especially in the case of two tier companies that are only 58. 
Table V shows that ROE does not significantly change pre and post the adoption of 
an alternative CGS. More interesting results regard the comparison of ROA in 2009 
for treated and controls. The outcomes from Table V affirm that the adoption 
of an alternative system (one tier or two tier board system) instead of a traditional one 
negatively affects ROA performance, net of the effect of the possible confounders 
listed in X2003. 
The results of sales to assets and of leverage are also in favour of our H0, confirming 






Income balance sheet items (2009) (One tier vs traditional) (Two tier vs traditional) 





Notes: *0.1 o p o 0.05; **0.05 o p o 0.01; ***p o 0.01 




treatment effect on 
treated (ATT) of 
balance sheet items 
values in 2009 of 
unlisted Italian joint 
stock companies 
with alternative 
CGSs vs traditional 
 
 
ROE 1.521 −0.687 −4.848 0.524 
ROA −1.520 −3.237*** −2.092 −2.784* 
Leverage −0.806 −11.551 0.348 −3.367 






One of the main questions about corporate governance is whether firm performance 
depends in some ways on it. If better corporate governance is connected to better firm 
performance, better-governed companies should perform better than poorly governed 
firms. This study is based on an analysis of the medium run effects of 2003 
Italian reform of corporate governance which introduces two alternative CGSs, giving 
both listed and unlisted companies the possibility to choose among the traditional 
and alternative CGSs. Focusing specifically our attention on the analysis of the 
performances of one and two tier board in comparison to the traditional one, the aim of 
this paper is to investigate in which way companies that switched into an alternative 
CGS have improved or not their performance. We analysed the outcomes obtained by  
Italian unlisted joint stock companies prior and after the introduction of 2003 Italian 
corporate law reform. The survey supplies descriptive statistics on a significant sample 
of unlisted joint stock companies, according to their CGS. In particular, we provide a 
general overview of the main features in terms of geographical distribution, economic 
activities, balance sheet and corporate items and accounting indices. The statistical  
analysis, using propensity score estimation strategy, is able to reduce the effect of 
selection bias. Selection bias might arise when firms that decided to change the CGS 
into an alternative one systematically differ from the sample of traditional firms for a  
set of observable indicators affecting the choice of the system. The variables that may 
affect both the probability of choosing the alternative system and performance 
outcomes may pollute the estimation of the interplay between CGS and 
performance. Controlling for these variables and comparing firms adopting an 
alternative system only with the traditional ones that show similar features in terms of 
2003 balance sheet indices is the best way for reducing the effect of confounders and is  
successfully realized through the application of propensity score matching. The set of  
confounders includes both qualitative (legal form, economic activity and geographical 
location) and quantitative variables (total assets, net worth, net assets and the starting 
level of the outcome variables before the change of the CGS) according the 2003 values 
of balance sheet items and accounting indices. 
Indeed, the opportunity of evaluating the effect of the change of a CGS through a  
match of units with close values of propensity score is legitimated by the fact that  
before the corporate law reform, which took place in 2003, all the companies included in  
the sample were obliged to adopt a traditional system. Hence, the use of a common start 
point for matching both the traditional and alternative firms allows us for protecting 
estimates by the risk of and endogenous relationship between performances and the 
choice of a CGS. In addition, the availability of a larger set of control units (traditional  
firms) to be matched with treated ones (alternative ones), allows us for a good choice of 
observations to match. 
Therefore the analysis, that focuses on a heretofore unexplored sample of more than 
15,000 unlisted joint stock companies, is led separately for the comparison of 
performances of firms that adopted a one tier board vs the traditional one and for the 
comparison of two tier board performances vs the traditional one. 
The set of dependent variables of the model representing the outcome variables 
measured at the end of 2009 (after the adoption of a CGS) are: return on equity; return on 
assets; leverage ratio and; the sales to assets ratio. Our analysis shows that the adoption 
of a one-tier model of corporate governance between 2003 and 2009 has not improved 
performance indicators and in particular ROE, sales/assets and leverage have remained 
stable after six years from the implementation of the reform, in accordance with the H0 of 
 
 
our model. Furthermore, ROA seems to be worst for companies that decided to adopt a 
one tier board, reinforcing the idea that the change of a governance system into a one tier  
one did not improved performances. Similarly, there are not significant differences  
between the performances of firms adopting a two tier board system with those that 
confirm a traditional one in terms of ROE, sales/assets and leverage. In this case there is 
also a light evidence of a worsened performance in ROA for two tier board companies. 
This evidence may partially explain the low number of companies adopting this model, 
which represents a very small percentage of the whole universe of unlisted Italian joint 
stock companies, notwithstanding financial literature highlights lower costs of corporate 
bodies in one tier board system. 
 
Notes 
1. Technically the universe is composed by joint stock companies and single shareholders joint  
stock companies. 
2. (138+180)/57,425 ¼ 0.55%. 
3. The choice of that interval relies to the effect of the Reform that allows for leaving out the  
traditional system and for adopting an alternative one since the 1 January 2004. Therefore,  
2003 was the last year with a unique corporate governance system in Italy and it is the most 
recent baseline for a comparison, ceteris paribus, of the increase or decrease of performance 
indices for the sampled firms. 
4. The variables used for the specification of propensity score are measured in 2003 and are  
those that included in Table IV; with the addition of the geographical area and a dummy  
variable for distinguishing the financial companies from industrial ones. 
5. This is particularly true for the case of two tier board system, where the scarce sample size  
(only 58 firms) in comparison of the high number of control units required an accurate  
selection of units to match. 
6. We distinguish unlisted joint stock companies with only one shareholder from those 
that have more than one, in order to take into account for the ownership structure of each 
sampled firm. 
7. We use economic sector classification according to the ATECO of 2007, used in Table III,  
even if propensity score algorithm considers main sectors as not significant in predicting the  
choice of a one tier board system. In addition, the scarce frequency of some categories and 
the large number of them in comparison to the treated units does not allow us for using all the  
information. Hence, the use of some sectors in propensity score specification has to be 
considered as a robustness check. 
8. We adopt the classification illustrated in Table II. 
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